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I. INTRODUCTION
European integration is commonly seen as the deepening of links between 
the European Union (hereafter 'EU' or 'Union') and its Member States, on 
the one hand, and the links between individual Member States, on the other 
hand. This is usually achieved by enhancing the powers of the Union over the 
powers of the individual Member States.  
Enhancing European integration is considered necessary in certain areas 
because the EU is seen as the most appropriate level to deal with issues that 
go beyond the national sphere. From a legal perspective, integration is subject 
to three cornerstone constitutional principles of the EU legal order: the 
conferral principle,1 the principle of subsidiarity,2 and the principle of 
                                                 
1 Under the conferral principle, the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it the Member States (Article 5(2) Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU). 
2 Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States […] but can rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level 
(Article 5(3) TEU). 
2018} Application of National Law by the ECB 157 
 
 
proportionality.3 The idea of creating a European Banking Union was no 
exception to this concept of European integration since it seeks to give the 
European Central Bank (ECB) certain supervisory tasks over the EU financial 
system. The global financial crisis that hit the Union and in particular the 
Eurozone in the late 2000s exposed the deficiencies and systemic risks 
arising from the existing regulatory and supervisory architecture. A 
consensus was reached that the banking sector could no longer be governed 
exclusively at the national level. The way in which banking supervision was to 
be developed at the European level included several new features.  
In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the European Banking Union was set 
up based on three pillars. The first two, the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM)4 and Single Resolution Mechanism,5 were designed to ensure that all 
European banks would be subject to uniform supervision, as well as to ensure 
orderly bank resolutions when necessary. The third pillar, a common 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme, is still awaiting completion.6 
                                                 
3 Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall 
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty (Article 5(4) 
TEU). 
4 Council Regulation (EU) 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on 
the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions [2013] OJ L287/63 (hereafter 'SSM-R') and Regulation (EU) 
468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework 
for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European 
Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated 
authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) [2014] OJ L141/1 (hereafter 'SSM-FR'). 
5 Regulation (EU) 806/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 July 2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 [2014] OJ 225/1 with its implementing and delegated acts (the regulation is 
currently under review). For an overview, see also Karl-Philipp Wojcik 'Bail-in the 
Banking Union' (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 91, 100-106.  
6 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2016 
on Deposit Guarantee Schemes |2014] OJ L 173/149; European Commission 'Effects 
Analysis on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme', (2016) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/161011-edis-effect-analysis_en.pdf> 
accessed 9 March 2018. 
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Prior to the creation of the European Banking Union, the integration of the 
European financial system took place in four steps.7 A process of 'integration 
through harmonisation' occurred from 1973 to 1984, based on the principle of 
the full harmonisation of national rules while maintaining home-country 
control and the principle of non-discrimination. Given its rather limited 
success,8 a shift took place from 1985 through 1998. Minimum harmonisation 
replaced full harmonisation. This shift notably led to the provision of a 'single 
passport' to financial institutions for the provision of services throughout the 
then Community.9 As noted by Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, Director General of 
the Secretariat and Secretary to the Decision-making Bodies of the ECB, 
Member States were required to 'adapt their laws and regulations' but only to 
meet minimum levels of harmonization in an effort to prevent a 'race to the 
bottom'.10 A process of integration through governance followed from 1999 
through 2007, characterized by the introduction of a common currency, the 
Euro, and the transfer of monetary policy from national central banks to the 
ECB in accordance with the Financial Services Action Plan and the 
Lamfalussy framework of governance.  
The global financial crisis eventually hit Europe, where the financial crisis was 
followed by the Eurozone crisis. Therefore, from 2008 through 2012, 
                                                 
7 Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, 'Europeanising prudential banking supervision – Legal 
foundations and implications for European integration' (2014) 2/14 Arena Report 
Series <http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
reports/2014/report-2-14.pdf#page=537> accessed 3 January 2018, 532. 
8 See European Commission, 'Completing the Internal Market' (1985) White Paper 
COM(85)310 
<http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf> 
accessed 11 March 2018. For an account of the different approaches towards 
harmonisation, see, for instance, Jacques Pelkmans, 'The new approach to technical 
harmonization and standardization' (1987) 25/3 Journal of Common Market Studies 249. 
9 See, in particular, Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the 
Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the 
Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending 
Directive 77/780/EEC, OJ L 386, 30 December 1989. 
10 Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, 'Europeanising prudential banking supervision – Legal 
foundations and implications for European integration' (2014) 2/14 Arena Report 
Series <http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-reports/ 
2014/report-2-14.pdf#page=537> accessed 3 January 2018, at 545. 
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Member States engaged in the fourth integration phase that may be 
described as 'integration through crisis', during which they implemented 
unilateral and intergovernmental actions11 primarily aimed at safeguarding 
their own interests at the expense of the 'EU common interest'. During this 
period, while the making of banking regulation was divided between the 
European and the national levels of governance, the organisation of banking 
supervision, the enforcement of regulatory rules and the resolution of banks 
resided exclusively within the ambit of the Member States. This institutional 
framework corresponded to the traditional form of EU integration, 
described as an indirect or decentralised enforcement of EU law. On the one 
hand, rules for certain substantive issues were adopted at the EU level, 
subject to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, i.e. the EU would 
legislate in these fields only to the extent necessary. On the other hand, 
Member States were the primary enforcers of such rules through their own 
national supervisory frameworks. They also retained the power to legislate as 
long as a given action was not viewed as being better achieved at EU level. 
This paper aims to analyse the rules enshrined in the SSM Regulation ('SSM-
R') and their practical legal implications in order to show to what extent they 
differ from traditional modes of European integration. In other words, its 
purpose is to determine whether the SSM's features make it an 'original' or 
'new' mode of European integration, thus breaking with the traditional 
modes of European legal integration. 
Admittedly, the concept of European legal integration is a rather loose one.12 
Generally speaking, it is viewed as referring to a process of integration 
through law: while the law is a product of the European Union, the European 
                                                 
11 Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis (Cambridge University Press 2014); 
Thomas Beukers, Claire Kilpatrick and Bruno de Witte (eds),  Constitutional Change 
through Euro-Crisis-Law (Cambridge University Press 2017); on the positive aspect of 
intergovernmentalism see Daniela Jaros, '"The Eurozone Crisis" – A Book Debate In 
Defence of "Good Intergovernmentalism"' (Verfassungsblog, 12 April 2014) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/in-defence-of-good-intergovernmentalism-2/> accessed 
9 March 2018;  
12 Hanne Petersen, Anne-Lise. Kjaer, Helle Krunke & Mikael Rask Madsen, 'General 
introduction: Paradoxes of European legal integration' in Hanne Petersen, Anne-
Lise. Kjaer, Helle Krunke & Mikael Rask Madsen (eds) Paradoxes of European legal 
integration (Routledge 2008). 
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Union is also, to some extent, a creature of the law.13 For the purposes of this 
paper, European legal integration is used to refer to the process through 
which EU law gradually penetrates into the domestic law of its Member 
States,14 or the process according to which EU law 'behaves like an occupying 
authority on foreign soil, by making use of national procedures and by 
mobilizing state organs so as to directly incorporate its norms with the 
national jurisdiction of the EU states'.15 
By 'traditional mode of European integration', we refer to the ways in which 
EU law has penetrated the national legal orders so far. This pertains partly to 
the legal tools used by the EU institutions. Basic principles are entrenched in 
the EU's constitutive treaties, such as the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, 
proportionality, sincere cooperation, or equal treatment and non-
discrimination. In addition, the European legislator has at its disposal 
different acts of secondary legislation, namely regulations, directives, 
individual acts or acts of soft law. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has recognized additional fundamental concepts, namely the 
principles of direct effect,16 and of primacy of EU law.17 It has also developed 
defining principles of interpretation with the aim of ensuring consistent 
application of EU law across the Member States, namely the principle of the 
autonomy of the EU legal order and of effectiveness of EU law.  
In addition, EU law has traditionally penetrated the national orders 
according to two main patterns. First, the decentralized (or indirect) model 
of execution of EU law, which is by far the most common within the EU legal 
order, implies that while substantive law-making takes place at EU level, 
Member States are entrusted with the task of applying such rules according 
to their own procedures and through the national state organs. It is in this 
                                                 
13 See Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph Weiler (eds), Integration through 
law: Europe and the American federal experience, Vol. 1: Methods, tools and institutions 
(Walter de Gruyter and Co. 1986). 
14 Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, 'Europe before the Court: A political theory of 
legal integration' (1993) 47/1 International Organization 43.  
15 Loïc Azoulai, 'The force and forms of European legal integration' (2011) 6 EUI 
Working Paper 1. 
16 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos EU:C:1963:1. 
17 Case 6/64 Costa c. ENEL EU:C:1964:66. 
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context that the CJEU has recognized the principle of procedural autonomy 
of the Member States.18 Second, the centralized (or direct) model of 
execution of EU law signifies that the EU institutions are responsible for the 
application, implementation and enforcement of EU rules. A typical example 
is competition law, for which the European Commission may impose fines 
and other sanctions on undertakings infringing the competition provisions of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Where does the SSM lie against this background? The SSM is intended to 
create 'an efficient and effective framework for the exercise of specific 
supervisory tasks over credit institutions by a Union institution' and to 
ensure 'the consistent application of the single rulebook to credit 
institutions'.19 The ECB is its cornerstone. In accordance with Article 127(6) 
TFEU and Article 4(1) and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EU) 1024/2013 (SSM-
R), almost all prudential powers over the Eurozone's largest banks and the 
power to regulate market access with regard to all banks in the Eurozone have 
been transferred to the ECB. Moreover, pursuant to Article 6 SSM-R, powers 
of indirect oversight over national competent authorities with regard to their 
supervision of smaller banks in the Eurozone have also been assigned to the 
ECB. Against this background, the SSM comprises several peculiar features. 
Our survey of these features will demonstrate how and why the SSM 
constitutes a new mode of European integration. As we will see, the SSM 
consists in a direct application by a European institution of national (rather 
than EU) law, thus breaking with the traditional ways in which EU law has so 
far penetrated the national legal systems (II). The paper then discusses the 
practical implications and complexities created by this original legal 
                                                 
18 See, for instance, Case 33/76  Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe Zentral AG v. 
Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland EU:C:1976:188, 5: '[…] in the absence of 
Community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member 
State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural 
conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights 
which citizens have from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood 
that such conditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar actions 
of a domestic nature […] the position would be different only if the conditions and 
time-limits made it impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the national 
courts are obliged to protect'. 
19 Recital 87 SSM-R. 
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framework (III) before looking at it in light of the theory of European 
integration (IV). 
II. SURVEYING THE NOVEL FEATURES OF THE SSM 
The SSM is based on a fundamental distinction between banking regulation 
and banking supervision. While the former mostly refers to prudential rules20 
applicable to credit institutions, the latter relates to the enforcement of those 
prudential rules and the structure of the authorities responsible for 
enforcement.  
Systemic risks inherent in the previous system of national supervision of 
credit institutions operating within an integrated European market were very 
clearly exposed during the Eurozone crisis. The EU and, in particular, the 
Member States of the Eurozone realized that the discrepancy between the 
different supervision of credit institutions across the Eurozone by the 
national supervisors gave rise to profound deficiencies and put the 
sustainability of the whole system at risk. Just as the creation of the monetary 
union was intended to solve the 'impossible trinity'21 of fixed exchange rates, 
free movement of capital and autonomous monetary policy, the creation of 
the banking union was aimed at solving the 'financial trilemma'22 of financial 
                                                 
20 'Prudential' means relevant to the stability of the financial markets. Typical 
'prudential rules' are therefore capital or liquidity requirements for banks or 
governance requirements. In addition to 'prudential rules', there are other rules 
banks must comply with, such as, for example, rules related to consumer protection, 
which are not prudential as their primary objective differs from that of the stability 
of the financial markets (what may be best for the protection of consumer interests 
may not be best in terms of financial stability). In practice, of course, the distinction 
is not always clear-cut, given that overall compliance with non-prudential rules has an 
impact on compliance with prudential rules and vice-versa. 
21 Robert A. Mundell, 'Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and 
Flexible Exchange Rates' (1963) 29 Canada Journal of Economics 475; Marcus J. 
Fleming, 'Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange 
Rates,' (1962) 9 IMF Staff Papers 369; Maurice Obstfeld, Jay Shambaugh and Alan 
Taylor 'The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs among Exchange Rates, Monetary 
Policies, and Capital Mobility' (2005) 87 Review of Economics and Statistics 423-438. 
22 Dirk Schoenmaker, 'The Financial Trilemma' (2011) Economics Letters 111 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340395> accessed 3 May 2018. 
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stability, national financial regulation and cross-border banking (financial 
integration). In order to safeguard financial stability and an integrated 
banking market, Member States thus decided that action at EU level was 
necessary, since only further integration of financial regulation across the EU 
could address the many challenges23 brought about by the Eurozone crisis. 
Against this background, the SSM was conceived and the SSM-R and the 
SSM-FR were adopted in 2013 and 2014 respectively. 
As far as the SSM-R is concerned, its recitals stress the need for more 
European integration and are thus in line with the traditional méthode 
communautaire. The recitals also point to the fragmentation of the financial 
sector and the threat it poses to other EU policies, namely the single 
monetary policy and the internal market. This gives rise to a need to intensify 
the integration of banking supervision, which in turn will bolster the Union, 
restore financial stability, and ultimately lead to economic recovery.24 
As mentioned above, instead of harmonising national substantive prudential 
laws,25 the SSM-R focuses exclusively on the modes of supervision of credit 
institutions. In other words, it does not focus on the content of the rules 
applicable to credit institutions, but on the interplay between supervisors, as 
well as the tasks and powers of the latter. Below (see Section III.1), we discuss 
how this plays out in practice and examine the extent to which the ECB does 
in fact act as a regulator, notwithstanding the supposed deference to national 
prudential rules, by virtue of its mandate.   
                                                 
23 It should also be noted that participating in the Banking Union was made a condition 
for receiving loans from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that was set up as 
a result of crisis to provide emergency loans to Eurozone Member States that have 
(had) difficulties servicing their sovereign debt obligations. On the conditionality of 
the 'troika's' loans to Eurozone countries in distress, see also Tuori and Tuori (n 13).  
24 See, for instance, Recital 2 of the SSM-R, which provides that: 'The present financial 
and economic crisis has shown that the integrity of the single currency and the 
internal market may be threatened by the fragmentation of the financial sector. It is 
therefore essential to intensify the integration of banking supervision in order to bolster the 
Union, restore financial stability and lay the basis for economic recovery' [emphases 
added]. 
25 On the harmonisation of prudential rules, see below under 3.2. 
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In line with other processes that aim to further European integration, the 
SSM-R centralises banking supervision at the ECB. Supervision of credit 
institutions, previously within the remit of national authorities, is now the 
responsibility of the ECB. Given the limits of Article 127(6) TFEU,26 which 
only provides for the power to confer 'specific tasks' regarding prudential 
supervision to the ECB, the European legislator could not opt for a total 
transfer of supervisory tasks to the ECB. Instead, it has set up a complex 
supervisory architecture, involving both the European and the national levels. 
While the aim of the SSM-R is to centralise supervision at the ECB, the SSM 
creates a continuing role for the national authorities, relying on them for 
expertise, implementation, and, at a more basic level, manpower.27 However, 
the SSM-R avoided relying on clear-cut criteria to divide the respective 
competences of the ECB and the national supervisors. Instead, the concept 
of 'significance' of credit institutions (Article 6(4) SSM-R)28 is at the heart of 
the SSM-R: the ECB is now the sole institution responsible for the 
supervision of 'significant institutions', with further responsibility to devise 
the so-called 'common procedures'29 and to indirectly supervise 'less 
                                                 
26 Article 127(6) TFEU forms the legal basis of the SSM-R, which was thus adopted 
unanimously by the Member States. It provides that 'The Council, acting by means 
of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, 
and after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, 
confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to 
the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with 
the exception of insurance undertakings'. 
27 Gianni Lo Schiavo, 'The Single Supervisory Mechanism: Building a New Top-Down 
Cooperative Supervisory Governance in Europe' in Federico Fabbrini et al. (eds), 
What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart 2015). 
28 Significance is determined based on criteria set out in Article 6 (4) SSM-R, the list of 
supervised credit institutions and financial holding companies, updated in 2017, is 
available at 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/list_of_supervised_entitie
s_20160331.en.pdf?54830cfdd60d51025d0fd0716d4376e2> accessed 3 January 2018. 
29 'Common procedures' are: Authorisation of credit institutions and withdrawal of 
authorisations of credit institutions (Article 4 (1) (a) SSM-R) and as well as the 
assessment of notifications of the acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings in 
credit institutions (Article 4 (1) (c) SSM-R). 
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significant institutions'.30 National competent authorities retain certain 
powers with regard to significant institutions (i.e. anti-money-laundering) 
and the power to directly supervise less significant institutions. 
The SSM has been described as a 'unique and unprecedented juxtaposition of 
European and national competences', including: (i) exclusive competences of 
supervision of the ECB; (ii) national competences of supervision; (iii) 
instruction/oversight competences of the ECB; and (iv) shared and parallel 
competences among the ECB and national supervisors.31 In parallel to this 
division of competences, the SSM-R has also introduced an 'integrating' 
organizational set-up through the creation of so-called Joint Supervisory 
Teams (JSTs).32 Supervisors at the ECB and from national competent 
authorities work together on a daily basis in JSTs led by JST-coordinators at 
the ECB. European and national competences are thus deeply intertwined, 
even though the ECB has the final say about the qualification of a credit 
institution. 
While the SSM-R relies on a dichotomy between banking regulation and 
banking supervision and primarily deals with the latter, it nonetheless does 
not ignore the former entirely. Instead, it deals with regulation in an original 
and somewhat troubling manner, since it relies, to an unprecedented extent, 
on national substantive laws. It does so according to three distinct schemes. 
Firstly, Article 4(3) SSM-R expressly provides that the ECB is to apply 'all 
relevant Union law' while carrying out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM-
R, which may imply applying national laws directly. This may occur in two 
situations. Where Union law is composed of Directives, the ECB is required 
to apply 'the national legislation transposing those Directives', which may 
thus differ from one Member State to another. Alternatively, where Union 
law is composed of Regulations and where such Regulations grant options for 
Member States, the ECB is equally required to apply 'the national legislation 
exercising those options', which similarly is likely to differ across the 
Member States. 
                                                 
30 'Guide to Banking Supervision' (ECB) <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ 
ecb/pub/pdf/ssmguidebankingsupervision201411.en.pdf> accessed 3 January 2018. 
31 Teixeira (n 9) at 554.  
32 Recital 79 of the SSM-R; Articles 3-6 SSM-FR. 
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Secondly, Article 6(5)(a) SSM-R grants the ECB powers through which it shall 
instruct – through regulations, guidelines or general instructions – national 
regulators on how they are to perform their supervisory tasks33 and on how 
they are to adopt their supervisory decisions. In other words, even when it 
does not have an exclusive competence, the ECB has been granted the power 
to instruct national regulators on how to apply their respective national laws. 
Thirdly, under the third subparagraph of Article 9(1) SSM-R, when the ECB 
lacks certain powers to carry out the tasks conferred on it by the SSM-R, the 
ECB may instruct national regulators to make use of their powers 'under and 
in accordance with the conditions set out in national law'. In other words, the 
ECB may require national regulators to fill in when it is itself not entitled to 
intervene. 
Hence, for the first time in the history of EU integration, an EU institution 
must make direct use of national law while carrying out the tasks conferred 
on it by EU law. The following sections scrutinize the various practical 
implications of the aforementioned provisions and show how these 
provisions ultimately create what can be described as a new form of 
integration. 
III. ISSUES ARISING FROM THE DIRECT APPLICATION OF NATIONAL 
LAW BY THE ECB 
The aforementioned Articles 4(3), 6(5)(a) and 9(1) SSM-R raise difficult 
questions about the delineation of competences between the ECB and 
national competent authorities, on the one hand, and the extent to which 
national laws are applicable, on the other hand. A delineation of competences 
and a common understanding of the applicable law is, however, necessary to 
understand: (a) the degree to which integration is intended by the SSM-R and 
(b) the contexts in which national supervisors (and consequently Member 
States) remain competent. In the absence of clarity on the distribution of 
competences, legal certainty and foreseeability are undermined. In this 
regard, three types of problems can be identified. 
                                                 
33 Excluding the authorisation of credit institutions, the withdrawal of authorisations 
of credit institutions (Article 4(1)(a)), and the assessment of notifications of the 
acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings in credit institutions (Article 4 (1) (c)). 
2018} Application of National Law by the ECB 167 
 
 
First, in many cases, the transposition of directives is deeply embedded in 
pre-existing national provisions, partly in order to take into account national 
legislative and regulatory specificities. From the perspective of EU law, the 
purpose of directives is to harmonize substantive rules and outcomes while 
leaving it to Member States to choose the means for achieving this goal.34 
Therefore, it is often not easy to disentangle a national provision that 
corresponds to part of an EU directive from other provisions or parts of 
provisions that do not stem from EU law. However, this question must not 
be confused with the question of the division of competences between 
national authorities and the ECB.  
Second, national provisions are not only surrounded by other provisions 
within their national legal settings but may also have to be interpreted or 
applied in a specific way due to domestic case-law, soft-law instruments or 
administrative acts or practice. Can the ECB treat national legal provisions 
as black letter law that it can interpret autonomously, disregarding the 
national context of these provisions? The SSM-R leaves that question open.  
Third (3.3.), in the absence of a harmonized European administrative 
procedural law, the question of the extent to which the ECB is bound by 
procedural provisions that are part of national law arises. The SSM-R and the 
SSM-FR do contain a minimum of general procedural provisions. However, 
the regulations remain silent about whether national administrative 
provisions (e.g. deadlines) have to be applied in addition to those general 
provisions and about what happens when national provisions are more 
specific while not contradictory to those general provisions set in the 
regulations.  
The following subsections explore these three problem areas, linking them to 
current case law pending before the CJEU and the ECB's initial positions on 
these issues to date. In a fourth subsection (III.4), the paper looks at how 
these practical implications play out in the context of applicable remedies. 
                                                 
34 Article 288(3) TFEU; see further detail in Ulrich Haltern, Europarecht (Mohr Siebek 
UTB 2007) 336.  
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1. National Provisions Qualifying for Direct Application by the ECB under Article 
4(3) SSM-R 
For the purpose of banking supervision, the ECB may only apply national law 
within the limits of the competences transferred to it on the basis of Article 
127(6) TFEU, and therefore by Articles 4(1) and 5(2) SSM-R, and not beyond. 
Essentially, the ECB is competent to exercise all prudential supervisory 
powers with regard to credit institutions and financial holding companies, 
while Member States and their authorities remain competent for areas such 
as anti-money laundering and consumer protection with regard to banks, 
capital markets and insurance regulation as a whole, as well as for civil and 
company law issues. In practice, it is often difficult to delineate the 
competences transferred to the ECB from those remaining within the remit 
of national competent authorities and other national authorities. It is 
therefore not surprising that this issue has already given rise to two 
preliminary references to the CJEU,35 VTB Bank AG v Österreichische 
Finanzmarktaufsicht and Fininvest and Berlusconi v ECB, and has been 
addressed in a statement by the ECB in a letter sent to all supervised banks.36  
However, once this delineation is made and it is established that a certain 
task is within the competence of the ECB, Article 4(3) and Article 9 SSM-R 
will come into play. As explained above, for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks, 
the ECB may use directly applicable EU law (regulations), national law 
transposing EU law (directives) and national law exercising options granted 
to Member States. According to Article 9(1) Subparagraph 3 SSM-R it also 
has a third option. If needed for the fulfilment of the tasks assigned to it 
under Article 4(1) SSM-R, the ECB may instruct national competent 
authorities to make use of law that is not transposing EU law on behalf of the 
ECB. This third category can also be described as the ECB's indirect 
                                                 
35 Case C-52/17 VTB Bank (Austria) AG v Österreichische Finanzmarktaufsicht 
EU:C:2018:178, Case C-219/17 Fininvest and Berlusconi v ECB, see also Raffaele 
D'Ambrosio, 'The ECB and NCA liability within the Single Supervisory Mechanism' 
(2015) Banca d'Italia Quaderni di Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale 78, 79.  
36 European Central Bank, 'Additional clarification regarding the ECB's competence to 
exercise supervisory powers granted under national law'  
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/letterstobanks/shared/pdf/201
7/Letter_to_SI_Entry_point_information_letter.pdf?abdf436e51b6ba34d4c53334f01
97612> accessed 3 January 2018.   
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competence to make use of national law. In sum, the question whether the 
ECB can make use of a power assigned to competent authorities by national 
law has to be answered in a two-step-approach: (i) Is the ECB acting within 
the remit of Articles 4(1) and 5(2) SSM-R? (ii) If yes, is the provision it is 
intending to use a transposition of EU law or is it purely a national provision? 
If the former is the case, the ECB may apply that provision directly. If the 
latter is the case, it may instruct the relevant national authority to make use 
of this power on behalf of the ECB. As noted above, it is often difficult to 
determine whether a provision is 'purely national' or an implementation of 
EU law, given that laws implementing directives are often embedded into the 
national context and not so easy to disentangle.  
Both issues, the delineation of the ECB's competences from those of national 
competent authorities and the extent to which national laws apply, are 
complex. As noted, two requests for a preliminary ruling have been filed so 
far, each addressing a different aspect of the question. In VTB v 
Österreichische Finanzmarktaufsicht, the compatibility of a national provision 
with EU law is disputed37 while in Fininvest and Berlusconi v ECB, the applicant 
                                                 
37 Case C-52/17 VTB Bank (Austria) AG v Österreichische Finanzmarktaufsicht 
EU:C:2018:178. The relevant question referred is 'Does EU law (in particular, Article 
395(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 [...]  preclude a national provision such as 
that which was contained in Paragraph 97(1)(4) of the Bankwesengesetz (Law on 
Banking) [...] where, despite the fact that the conditions for applying the exemption 
provided for in Article 395(5) are satisfied, (absorption) interest is levied for a breach 
of Article 395(1)?' Put differently, the question is whether EU law can bar the use of a 
national provision aimed at economic oversight (which is outside the scope of the 
SSM-R) if that provision is linked to a breach of a prudential requirement (within the 
scope of the SSM-R). The advocate general's opinion from 13 March 2018 suggests 
that it does (para 67-69), arguing that making use of the national provision would 
distort the prudential provision in question. In its ruling of 7 August 2018, the Court 
came to the same conclusion as the AG. However, the main point the Court makes is 
that the national provision is linked to a breach of Article 395(1) CRR (automatically 
levying an interest) without examining the conditions of Article 395(5) CRR under 
which a breach of Article 395(1) would be allowed. It therefore concludes that Article 
97(1)(4) of the Bankwesengesetz is not compatible with EU law. With regard to the 
general qualification of the 'absorption of interest' as provided for in Article 97(1)(4), 
the Court further held that it must be qualified as administrative measures in the 
sense of Article 65(1) of the CRD IV (therefore 'implementing EU law').  
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has challenged what it considers to be an inaccurate application of domestic 
law by the ECB under Article 4(3) SSM-R.38  
2. Uniform Application of Implemented Directives Across the SSM 
The ECB might understandably wish to apply a harmonized set of rules 
across the 19 SSM Member States, given that the aim of the Banking Union 
is to level the supervisory playing field. If banking supervision is to be 
integrated, all banks should be subject to the same set of rules. The opposite 
is true if banks across Member States are treated differently based on 
diverging implementations of EU law. Indeed, applying 19 different 
implementations of the Basel III framework, which has been transposed at 
EU level in the form of a directive, namely Directive (EU) No 2013/36 (Capital 
Requirement Directive 'CRD IV'), and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 
(Capital Requirements Regulation 'CRR'), inevitably raises several 
challenges for the ECB.39  
First, the ECB is faced with multiple national laws, which are highly 
fragmented, partly because the current directives and regulations that set out 
prudential rules comprise over a hundred options and discretions left to the 
                                                 
38 Case C-219/17 Fininvest and Berlusconi v ECB: The applicants raise the issue of the 
distinction between the question of competence and of the correct application of 
national law. In a first set of pleas, the applicants have called into question the ECB's 
expansion of its powers under Article 4(1)(c) and Article 15 of the SSM-R, while, in a 
second set, they allege that the ECB has violated the principles of lawfulness, legal 
certainty and the foreseeability of the administrative action in applying Article 4(3) 
of the SSM-R and the national transposition of the applicable provisions, Article 23(1) 
and (4) of the CRD IV. 
39 The harmonized set of material rules applying to banking regulation in the EU is 
commonly referred to as the 'Single Rulebook'. It consists of the CRD IV, the CRR 
and other legal acts such as, in particular, Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) and 
Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) adopted at the level of the European 
Banking Authority (EBA), as well as Guidelines issued by the EBA. Whether the 
'Single Rulebook' provides for a truly harmonized set of rules has been critically 
challenged. See Valia Babis 'Single Rulebook for Prudential Regulation of Banks – 
Mission Accomplished?' (2014) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research 
Paper 37/2014 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2456642> 
accessed 4 January 2018 and Angelo Baglioni, The European Banking Union (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2016) 21.  
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Member States.40 Second, the ECB might be put in situations where Member 
States do not have consistently transposed EU secondary acts of legislation. 
Furthermore, it is not yet clear what precisely is meant by 'national law' in 
Article 4(3) SSM-R. It also remains unclear whether the ECB may interpret 
national provisions implementing the EU law autonomously, as it does by 
publishing guidance on the interpretation of the underlying CRD IV 
provisions, or whether it is bound by the national context surrounding 
national provisions, especially by national case-law. 
Therefore, which EU principles and mechanisms may the ECB rely on to 
ensure a uniform, effective and fair application of EU law and thus overcome 
the various challenges pointed out above? 
First, the SSM-R itself refers to the primacy of EU law in its recital 34. The 
primacy principle may accordingly constitute a powerful instrument through 
which the ECB could disapply any national rule that does not comply with 
EU law. The ECB could make strict use of the primacy principle in such a way 
as to ultimately apply the same set of rules across all the Member States. 
Second, the ECB may invoke the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 
4(3) of the Treaty on the European Union ('TEU')), under which 'the Union 
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in 
carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties' to justify 'favoring' EU law 
over national law. 
Third, it might also be tempting for the ECB to directly apply provisions 
from the directive, rather than the national provisions implementing this 
directive. The ability of European institutions, however, to apply directives 
directly is strictly limited, as set out in the case-law of the CJEU.41 Briefly put, 
direct application of directives is confined to situations in which an 
individual's rights are violated by his/her Member State's failure to 
implement a directive correctly (or failure to implement it at all) and is subject 
                                                 
40 'Overview of options and discretions set out in Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation 
(EU) No 575/2013' (European Banking Authority) < 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-disclosure/options-
and-national-discretions> accessed 3 January 2018. 
41  Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca, 'EU Law' (6th edition Oxford University Press 
2015) at 200s. 
172 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
 
to certain conditions, for example that the provision to be directly applied is 
unconditional and sufficiently precise. This case-law appears to preclude an 
organ of the European Union from directly applying a directive for the 
purpose of harmonization, even if the directive has been implemented 
inconsistently or incompletely. That being said, it may not be inconceivable: 
the CJEU has traditionally adopted a teleological approach and has 
sometimes adopted creative interpretations of EU law that are geared 
towards advancing and furthering European integration and preserving the 
integrity of the EU legal order. In recent years, the CJEU has notably upheld 
all challenged measures adopted by EU institutions or organs, such as the 
Eurogroup, in response to the sovereign debt and financial crises.42 On the 
one hand, it is noteworthy that the CJEU has never expressly precluded an 
EU institution from relying on the direct effect principle, since this issue has 
never been raised before. On the other hand, as noted above, it is the first 
time in the history of European integration that an EU institution has been 
entrusted with the task of applying national law. Therefore, a creative 
interpretation of the direct effect principle, coupled with the effectiveness 
and uniform application of EU law principles, could allow the ECB to directly 
rely on the EU rules instead of the corresponding domestic rules. In 
situations where Member States have manifestly transposed EU secondary 
acts of legislation incorrectly, the ECB could therefore argue that in order to 
perform the tasks entrusted to it by the SSM-R and to comply with the 
primacy and effectiveness principles, it has a 'duty' to directly apply the EU 
provision, notwithstanding the absence of any corresponding national rule. 
In other words, if the CJEU has paved the way for individuals to rely on the 
direct effect doctrine, why would it not reach a similar conclusion regarding 
an EU institution charged with applying a coherent set of rules in the 
Members States in the face of highly fragmented national provisions? 
Fourth, the ECB could refer where possible to acts of the European Banking 
Authority ('EBA'), the common European Banking regulator that has already 
                                                 
42 See, in particular: Case C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756 and Case C-62/14 Gauweiler 
EU:C:2015:7. See also, among others, Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P 
Konstantinos Mallis and others EU:C:2016:702 on a 2013 Eurogroup statement 
concerning the restructuring of the banking sector in Cyprus. 
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established harmonized rules in this sector.43 The EBA can issue regulatory 
and implementing technical standards, which can be elevated to the status of 
an EU regulation if the EBA has been delegated authority to adopt such 
standards under the relevant secondary law acts. Furthermore, the EBA may 
also issue guidelines on any matter arising from the legal acts referred to in 
Article 16(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 ('EBA-R'). Such guidelines are 
not legally binding, but are subject to a 'comply or explain' mechanism under 
Article 16(3) EBA-R. In this way, supervisory authorities (which now include 
the ECB) must declare whether they comply with the EBA guidelines or 
explain why they do not. The EBA must stay within the limits of the 
applicable secondary law acts when releasing such guidelines. What EBA 
guidelines do, however, is provide much more detail on secondary law 
provisions. In this way, they harmonize the interpretation and sometimes 
even the process surrounding these provisions and they therefore do 
effectively bind supervisory authorities to interpret national law 
implementing directives in a particular way. In areas that are primarily 
regulated by CRD IV, and not by its directly applicable counterpart, the 
CRR, it is useful for the purpose of applying a uniform set of rules across the 
Eurozone that the EBA produces guidelines that are as detailed as possible in 
order to harmonize the understanding of implemented provisions.  
While relying on the regulatory products of the EBA, the ECB may, however, 
also act as a regulator to a limited extent. National supervisory authorities 
generally do produce soft law such as circulars, guidance or minimum 
standards. Within a limited mandate that varies from Member State to 
Member State, they sometimes even produce legally binding regulatory 
products in order to make supervisory expectations and practice more 
transparent for market participants and to optimize the supervisory process. 
The ECB also produces similar soft law instruments through public 
                                                 
43 For a critical examination of the EBA's role see 'European banking supervision taking 
shape — EBA and its changing context' (European Court of Auditors, 2014) 
<https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR14_05/SR14_05_EN.pdf> 
accessed 5 January 2018. 
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consultations,44 general communications (letters),45 and recommendations, 
as well as legally binding decisions and regulations.46 To elaborate on the 
nature of these different instruments would go beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, it is important to note that several of these ECB 
instruments do attempt to provide a firm interpretation of CRD IV 
provisions, even if they always contain the disclaimer 'notwithstanding 
national law'. Areas of prudential banking regulation such as internal 
governance, suitability requirements for members of the management bodies 
of credit institutions and remuneration policies within banks are solely 
regulated by the CRD IV and not by the CRR as they are generally closely 
linked to national company law, which is not harmonized across the EU. If 
the ECB creates a guide on the relevant CRD IV provisions,47 the question is 
how these guides interact with the national provisions implementing these 
CRD IV provisions and how they relate to national case law, soft law 
instruments or administrative practice.  
One may question how far the ECB's mandate to regulate may be stretched: 
when does the task of the legislator end and where does administrative 
practice start? It is known from national contexts that the line between 
legislative and executive levels of government may not always be easily drawn. 
Within the SSM, the difficulty of separating the legislative from the 
executive is ultimately closely linked with the political questions of (i) how 
                                                 
44 'Public Consultations' (ECB) 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/html/index
.en.html> accessed 3 January 2018.  
45 'Letters to Banks' (ECB) 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/letterstobanks/html/index.en.
html> accessed 3 January 2018.  
46 'General Framework' (ECB) 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/ecblegal/framework/ht
ml/index.en.html> accessed 3 January 2018.  
47 For example, with regard to the suitability assessment of members of the 
management body of credit institutions, the ECB has published a 'Guide to Fit & 
Proper Assessments' 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.fap_guide_201705.en.
pdf?de3bbbd9ecadd9cd2d75889d39effaaf> accessed 3 January 2018; it has also 
published a Recommendation ECB/2016/44 on dividend distribution policies [2016] 
OJ 481/1.  
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much integration was intended through the SSM-R and (ii) whether the ECB 
has received a mandate to 'harmonize' national law implementing directives 
through a common administrative practice across all SSM Member States.  
The simplest solution to many of the problems raised in this subsection 
would be to merge the two-fold CRR/CRD IV regulatory regime into one or 
two directly applicable regulations. In that way, the possibility given to the 
ECB to use national law based on Article 4(3) SSM-R would practically 
become obsolete as almost all relevant prudential law for banks would be 
directly applicable. However, the European legislator has not chosen this 
path.  Instead, it seems to maintain the division between the CRR and CRD 
IV as it is foreseen now, at least as far as the Commission's proposals for the 
CRR 2 and CRD V are concerned.48 
3. Identifying Applicable Procedural Rules in Absence of a Common European 
Administrative Procedural Law 
The third problem arising from the direct application of national law under 
Article 4(3) SSM-R is the issue of the applicable procedural law. The EU does 
not have a harmonized body of law regulating administrative procedure; in 
fact, the CJEU has long recognized the principle of national procedural 
autonomy. While this is not a problem as long as national institutions have a 
national administrative law at their disposal, it becomes an issue when an EU 
institution is required to apply substantive national law (implementing an EU 
directive) without being bound by national administrative rules. Substantive 
and procedural rules cannot always be properly disentangled and there is a 
risk of distorting national provisions when applying them in a void without 
reference to their proper procedural framework. However, pursuant to 
                                                 
48 Proposal COM(2016) 854 final for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial 
holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory 
measures and powers and capital conservation measures [2016]; Proposal COM(2016) 
850 final for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding 
ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, 
market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment 
undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2016].  
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Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereafter 'ECHR') 
and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(hereafter 'CFR'), as well as the corresponding case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights49 and the CJEU,50 there are a number of supra-
national principles of fair trial and due process which have emerged in cases 
relating to criminal proceedings, and which can and have been extended to 
administrative procedures through the case-law of the respective courts.51 
These principles are access to independent courts, the right to a legal remedy 
and the principle of ne bis in idem. For the purpose of the SSM, the SSM-FR 
contains its own general due process provisions for adopting ECB supervisory 
decisions in its Title 2 (Articles 25 – 35 SSM-FR), including the right to be 
heard (Article 31 SSM-FR), the right to have access to files in the ECB 
supervisory procedures (Article 32 SSM-FR), the obligation for the ECB to 
state the reason (material facts and legal reasons) for any supervisory decision 
(Article 33 SSM-FR), as well as on the notification of ECB supervisory 
decisions (Article 35 SSM-FR).  
However, national administrative laws often contain more detailed 
procedural rules, such as deadlines, specific notification obligations or 
specific requirements with regard to form. Furthermore, each Member State 
draws a different line between substantive and procedural provisions – 
sometimes material provisions applying to the supervision of banks are 
stipulated in a separate set of rules from procedural provisions, such as 
deadlines, notification obligations, sanctions, the right to be heard or the 
right to appeal. Sometimes, these procedural provisions are integrated into 
the material provisions. The question that arises is to which extent the ECB 
can be bound by national procedural law: how far are the procedural elements 
                                                 
49 Engel et al v The Netherlands App no. 5100/71 (ECtHR, 23 November 1976) 
50 E.g. C-489/10 Bonda ECLI:EU:C:2012:319; C-617/10 Åklagaren v Akerberg Fransson 
EU:C:2013:105.  
51 Christoph Grabenwarter and Anna Katharina, 'Justiz- und Verfahrensgrundrechte' 
in Dirk Ehlers (ed) Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten (De Gruyter 2014); 
Jörg Gundel, 'Justiz- und Verfahrensgrundrechte' in, Dirk Ehlers (ed) Europäische 
Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten (De Gruyter 2014); Peter Jedlicka, 
'Vewaltungsgeldbußen im SSM – Steht der gewährte Rechtsschutz für 
Kreditinstitute im Einklang mit der Rechtssprechung von EGMR und EuGH?' 
(2016) Zeitschrift für Finanzmarktrecht 481.   
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of certain material provisions stemming from implementation of the CRD 
IV part of that implementation and when are they purely national 
administrative law? 52 
One practical way to answer this question is to say that procedural provisions 
may only be applied by the ECB insofar as they clearly stem from EU law. For 
example, the CRD IV does contain some procedural provisions, such as 
Article 22 CRD IV on the assessment of qualifying holdings in a credit 
institution, which stipulates in its paragraph 2 that competent authorities 
shall have a maximum period of 60 working days from the day they are 
notified of an intended acquisition. In these cases, this deadline will have to 
be applied by the ECB as implemented. However, there are less clear-cut 
examples of procedural provisions in the CRD IV, such as the assessment of 
suitability of members of the management body or key function holders. 
Here, the CRD IV only stipulates the material criteria that these persons 
have to fulfil, leaving it open to supervisory authorities to determine the 
process for assessing these criteria. Is this process then part of the 
implemented EU law that has to be applied by the ECB or can the ECB 
develop its own process, being bound only to ensure that the relevant persons 
fulfil the material suitability criteria as implemented? In practice, this 
problem has been solved with a compromise: the ECB has developed its own 
rather high-level assessment process through its Fit & Proper Guide,53 while 
national law may add more specific procedural provisions. 
4. Remedies 
From the credit institutions' perspective, the direct application of national 
law raises the question of what kind of remedies are available against 
supervisory decisions54 taken by the ECB or national authorities.  
                                                 
52 Klaus Lackhoff, 'Single Supervisory Mechanism – A practitioner's guide' (Beck 2017). 
53 ECB (n 49).  
54 With regard to 'decisions' taken by the ECB, within the meaning of administrative 
acts as defined in Article 288 TFEU, it is important to distinguish between the 
following: simple supervisory decisions (e.g. granting a license, approving a qualifying 
holding, approving a reduction of own funds, an application of a waiver, or the 
suitability of a member of a management body); supervisory measures (Article 16 
SSM-R based on Article 104 CRD IV), which are meant to reinstate legal compliance 
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Supervisory action generally takes the form 'decisions'. It is important to 
determine whether the ECB or the national competent authority ultimately 
issues a supervisory decision containing a supervisory measure or imposing a 
sanction, as this determines the remedies available to the addressee of the 
decision. Decisions issued as decisions of the ECB ('on ECB paper') may only 
be reviewed at the ECB-internal administrative board of review (Article 24 
SSM-R) or before the CJEU. Decisions issued by national competent 
authorities may be challenged before national administrative courts. In terms 
of European integration, this makes a big difference, especially as national 
courts have different bodies of case-law to refer to as compared to the CJEU, 
which has yet to develop its own case-law on this subject-matter and is limited 
to reviews pursuant to actions for annulment under Article 263 TFEU (recital 
60 to the SSM-R). Thus, no actions based on Article 261 TFEU can be 
brought.55 Such actions could have been relevant for remedies against 
pecuniary penalties imposed directly by the ECB (Article 18(1) SSM-R). 
Another complication arises from the fact that national competent 
authorities maintain far-reaching powers in areas for which the ECB is 
ultimately competent. In many cases, they prepare draft decisions that are 
then adopted by the ECB according to its decision-making procedure (see 
e.g. Article 14 or 15 of the SSM-R). In procedures pursuant to Article 15, 
national competent authorities assess a proposed acquisition (based on their 
implementation of Articles 22 and 23 CRD IV) and submit a draft decision to 
the ECB to either oppose or not oppose the acquisition. The Consiglio di Stato 
recently referred an interesting question arising from such a situation to the 
CJEU in a request for a preliminary ruling56 about the legal nature of draft 
decisions submitted by national authorities to the ECB and the basis on 
which the ECB makes its decisions. The status of these draft decisions is very 
relevant for present purposes as these decisions can be characterized as an 
                                                 
(e.g. by imposing additional own fund or liquidity requirements, by limiting variable 
remuneration, or by restricting business); and administrative sanctions (Article 18 
SSM-R), which generally consist of pecuniary penalties imposed for breaches of 
applicable prudential provisions. 
55 Jedlicka (n 51); Gijsbert ter Kuile, Laura Wissink and Willem Bovenschen, 'Tailor-
made Accountability within the Single Supervsiory Mechanism' (2015) 52 Common 
Market Law Review 155.  
56 Case C-219/17 Berlusconi and Fininvest v Banca d'Italia. 
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instance of 'the ECB applying national law': while national authorities draft 
the decision, with their expertise and knowledge of the national 
particularities, they are ultimately adopted by the ECB. The Court can deal 
with the question of whether an action for annulment against a decision of 
the ECB is sufficient if the decision is based on a draft proposal of a national 
competent authority, in particular if the decision of the national competent 
authority is solely based on national law and, in this case, national case-law. 
The Court can also say something about the legal nature of national 
competent authorities' draft decisions submitted to the ECB, especially as 
the ECB is not bound by them.  
In the national context, the problem could be turned around in cases where 
national competent authorities act upon instructions of the ECB (Article 9(1) 
SSM-R). In these cases too, the question can be asked whether the credit 
institution has a sufficient remedy in being able to appeal only against the 
national competent authorities' decision and not the underlying instruction 
of the ECB.  
To summarize, the supervision model set up by the SSM-R gives rise to many 
challenges with regard to the availability of effective remedies. The first issue 
that arises is that of the competent authority to supervise credit institutions. 
Identifying the competent authority is complicated by the fact that the SSM-
R does not comprise sufficiently clear-cut criteria to determine whether the 
ECB or the national authorities are competent.  
The second issue relates to the fact that it is extremely difficult to assess and 
characterize the nature of decisions taken by the ECB and the national 
authorities. The scenario which raises the fewest difficulties involves 
decisions taken by the ECB on the sole basis of EU law (e.g. application of 
provisions that do not involve national rules). Provided that the ECB is 
competent to exercise its supervision powers, the CJEU then has sole 
jurisdiction to review its decision. However, given the complexity of the 
mechanism, it is likely that other scenarios will arise. First, what happens 
when the ECB applies (and thus interprets) national law? The CJEU will have 
jurisdiction since the decision at stake has been taken by an EU institution, 
but it does not have jurisdiction to review national law. The CJEU would be 
faced with an unprecedented challenge, since the Treaties do not provide for 
any mechanism allowing the Court to refer questions of interpretation of 
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national law back to national courts. Second, how will national courts deal 
with cases where applicants challenge a decision adopted by a national 
authority that has done so on the basis of the ECB's instructions? Will 
applicants have to challenge both the 'national' decision before national 
courts and the ECB's instructions before the CJEU? How will the CJEU 
qualify the ECB's instructions? As decisions or as preliminary acts, which, as 
such, may not be challenged? What about the cases where a national 
authority acts on the basis of the ECB's instructions but misinterprets these 
instructions? How will national courts and the CJEU cooperate in a manner 
that does not undermine the EU primacy principle and ensure that EU law is 
applied consistently and uniformly across Member States?57  
Third, what happens when national authorities impose penalties in respect of 
breaches of national provisions transposing the SSM-R and Directive 
2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms? The CJEU has very 
recently ruled that such decisions are not governed by national law but rather 
by Article 65(1) of Directive 2013/36, i.e. by EU law.58 The second and third 
issues also give rise to a risk of lengthy procedures, especially when decisions 
are being simultaneously challenged at national and EU levels, such as replies 
to requests for preliminary rulings. Overall, there is a risk that the remedy 
regime as set up does not satisfy the due process requirements of Article 6 
ECHR and Article 51 CFR nor Article 13 ECHR on effective remedies. 
Further analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
Overall, as far as the availability of remedies is concerned, the SSM-R thus 
raises more issues than it solves. 
                                                 
57 Some of these questions are discussed by Andreas Magliari, ''Il Single Supervisory 
Mechanism' e l'applicazione dei diritti nazionali da parte della banca central europea,' 
(2016) <https://dottoratoblog.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/magliari_il-ssm-e-
lapplicazione-dei-diritti-nazionali-da-parte-della-bce.pdf> accessed 3 January 2018, 
at 32.  
58 Case C-52/17 VTB Bank (Austria) v. FMA at 41. 
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IV. THE SSM AS A HYBRID MODE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
It follows from the discussion above that not only are EU and national 
competences intricately intertwined, but so are EU and national laws. 
Nothing new so far, some could be tempted to say. The EU, like other federal 
polities, has indeed traditionally been characterized by a complex division of 
competences in many areas, where it is difficult to delineate the EU and 
national levels of governance and where EU and national laws are therefore 
deeply intertwined. However, the above discussion reveals that the specific 
features of the SSM-R, including the application of national law by an EU 
institution for the first time in the history of European integration, imply a 
new mode of European integration. This new way for EU law to penetrate 
into the national legal orders relates to three important aspects of the theory 
of European integration, as defined in the introduction: the mode of 
execution of EU law, the founding principles of EU law, and the role of EU 
institutions. These three aspects are discussed in turn below.  
1. The SSM as a Hybrid Mode of Execution of EU law 
The SSM represents a unique way to further European integration. On the 
one hand, it combines features of traditional forms of European integration, 
including: (i) situations where the ECB applies EU law i.e. instances of direct 
administration/enforcement of EU law; (ii) situations where national 
supervisors apply EU law, i.e. instances of indirect 
administration/enforcement of EU law; and (iii) situations where the ECB 
may instruct national supervisors, i.e. other instances of indirect 
administration. Such instances may already be found in other areas, in 
particular the law of state aid, when national authorities are required to 
recover an incompatible aid.59 
On the other hand, the application of national law by the ECB is an 
undeniably novel feature. From a European integration theory perspective, 
this means that an EU institution must draw on national law to carry out the 
tasks entrusted to it by EU law. This model does not correspond to any 
                                                 
59 Andreas Witte, 'The application of national banking supervision law by the ECB: 
Three parallel modes of executing EU law?' (2014) 21/1 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 89' at 97s. 
182 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
 
traditional scheme of execution of EU law. It does not involve direct 
enforcement of EU law. If the ECB does directly supervise credit 
institutions, it not only applies rules adopted at EU level, but also applies 
national rules that are intended to implement EU acts of secondary 
legislation. However, this situation is distinct from the indirect enforcement 
of EU law model, since the supervision is operated at EU level and not at 
national level. 
Instead, the governance model set up by the SSM-R consists of the EU 
legislator adopting rules that are subsequently transposed into national legal 
systems before being applied by an EU institution in decisions about national 
credit institutions.60 Thus, rules move back and forth from the EU legal order 
to national legal orders. This is coupled with a mix of direct execution of EU 
law, an EU institution enforcing a set of rules vis-à-vis individuals or legal 
persons, and a hybrid mode of execution of EU law, an EU institution 
applying EU rules as transformed by national authorities. 
Thus, it may be concluded that the SSM breaks with traditional modes of 
European integration, and constitutes a hybrid mode of execution of EU law 
in the sense that: (i) it furthers European integration to the extent that 
supervision per se has been centralized in the hands of the ECB, but (ii) it 
limits European integration to the extent that it still leaves it up to the 
Member States to decide on how to supervise the credit institutions covered 
by the SSM-R. 
Through this unique interplay between EU and national supervisory 
competences and prudential laws, the operation of the SSM may have deep 
implications for the founding principles of EU law. 
2. The SSM in Light of the Founding Principles of EU law 
The SSM has substantial implications for two main principles of EU law, 
namely the overarching principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order and 
the substantive principle of non-discrimination, which mirrors that of equal 
treatment. 
                                                 
60 Magliari (n 59) describes it as a 'circular movement', at 26-30. 
2018} Application of National Law by the ECB 183 
 
 
A. The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order 
Regarding the autonomy of the EU legal order, there is little doubt that 
having an EU institution apply national laws is a real challenge for the 
principles of effectiveness, consistency, uniformity, direct effect, and 
primacy.  
One might indeed wonder whether the complex supervisory architecture 
described above complies with the principle of effectiveness of EU law by 
creating a situation that could lead to an ineffective supervision of credit 
institutions.61 How can the ECB possibly pursue effective supervision while 
applying more than a dozen national laws? Is the ECB able to deal with the 
particularities and nuances of the national legal orders? In addition, as seen 
above, the many complexities of the SSM-R are likely to be exposed to 
litigation, not only on the rules on supervision themselves but also on the 
respective jurisdictions of the CJEU and of the national courts. 
In the same vein, having an EU institution apply national law, which itself 
transposes EU acts of secondary legislation, might undermine the principles 
of consistency and uniformity, which are central to the application of EU law, 
since the ECB could be led to apply the same provisions of EU law differently 
across the Member States. 
Finally, the SSM-R also raises the issue of the primacy principle, which is 
crucial for the preservation of the autonomy of the EU legal order.  
Admittedly, Recital 34 provides that the application of national law by the 
ECB 'is without prejudice to the principle of the primacy of Union law.' Such 
application must therefore be carried out to the extent that it does not breach 
this founding principle. But determining the extent to which a national rule 
complies with EU law is an extremely difficult task, especially because the 
                                                 
61 See Eddy Wymeersch, 'The Single Supervisory Mechanism or ''SSM'', part one of the 
Banking Union' (2014) European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law 
Working Paper 240/2014 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2397800&rec=1&srcabs=2403859&alg=1&pos=5> accessed 3 January 2018, at 5: 'As 
long as regulation and supervision were national, these differences did not create 
internal tensions, but led to significant cross-border friction […]. In the future the 
opposite is likely to occur, which will affect the effectiveness of supervision, as the 
single supervisor will be obliged to act on the basis of divergent 'underlying' national 
regulations in different Member States.' 
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relevant EU acts of secondary legislation leave many options open to the 
Member States. 
B. The Principle of Non-Discrimination 
Turning now to the substantive principles of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment, the application of national law by the ECB to the significant 
institutions alongside the tasks carried out by national supervisors vis-à-vis 
less significant institutions might entail two sets of implications.  
Firstly, significant banks might be supervised differently across Member 
States. If Member State A has more stringent rules than Member State B, the 
ECB will apply more stringent rules to credit institution A than to credit 
institution B. As a result, significant credit institutions might be 
discriminated against on the basis of their place of residence. The SSM 
therefore does not solve the issue that supervision may still be more or less 
stringent across Member States.  
Secondly, there is a risk that the ECB, when supervising a significant 
institution in Member State A, could interpret and apply a national rule in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the interpretation of the national 
supervising authority that has retained the competence to supervise less 
significant institutions. Once again, this is likely to give rise to litigation and 
raise issues as to which of the EU or national courts has jurisdiction to settle 
the disputes. 
3 The SSM and the Role of EU Institutions 
From a broader perspective, the SSM-R raises doubts about the functions 
that can be properly performed by EU institutions. It should be recalled, in 
this respect, that one of the main purposes of the European Union is to create 
'an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe', which necessarily 
requires going beyond, and sometimes even conflicting with, national 
interests. This can be compared to the tasks carried out by the Member 
States at the national level which seek to pursue the national public interest, 
which in turn subsumes the interests of the individual members of their 
polity.  
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In this regard, the CJEU has already described the Community (now Union) 
system as being 'designed to ensure that the general interest of the 
Community [Union] would be protected'62 against national interests which, 
if they were to prevail, could jeopardize the sustainability of the whole 
system. In other words, it has drawn a clear distinction between the 
respective interests of the Member States and the Union.63 The EU 
institutions are therefore logically under an obligation to pursue, develop, 
and preserve the Union's general interest. The Commission, which 'shall 
promote the general interest of the Union',64 is the institution which embodies 
this general interest to the greatest extent. As the General Court has put it, 
the Commission 'exercises its functions entirely independently from the 
Member States in the general interest of the Community [Union]'.65 The 
same goes for the Council, even if it is, admittedly, a platform where Member 
States may raise their 'national voices'. The Court has stressed that, when 
adopting new uniform rules at EU level, the Council is 'required to take 
account not of the special interests of the various Member States, but of the 
general interest of the Community [Union] as a whole'.66 As a result, the EU 
secondary acts of legislation also necessarily embody the Union's general 
interest.67 
Where does the ECB, to the extent that it applies national laws while carrying 
out its supervisory tasks, lie? The SSM-R is the result of tough negotiations 
between Member States, which have ultimately consented to a more 
centralized supervision of their credit institutions without agreeing to a 
uniform way of supervising them. Two situations should be distinguished. 
                                                 
62 Case 231/78 Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland EU:C:1979:101 at 15. 
63 See, for instance, Case 2/60 Niederrheinische Bergwerks - Aktiengesellschaft and 
Unternehmensverband des Aachener Steinkohlenbergbaues v High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community EU:C:1961:15 at 145. 
64 Article 17 TEU [emphasis added]. 
65 Case T-41/98 Nederlandse Antillen v. Commission EU:T:2000:36 at 59. 
66 Case C-150/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of the 
European Union EU:C:1998:547 at 62. See also, in the same vein: Case 46/76 W. J. G. 
Bauhuis v The Netherlands EU:C:1977:6 at 29. 
67 See, for instance, Case C-128/89 Commission v. Italy EU:C:1990:311 at 14 and Case C-
282/90 Vreugdenhil v. Commission EU/C/1992/124 at 24. 
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When the ECB applies regulations and directives that do not leave the 
Member States with any leeway, it can be argued that it promotes, like any 
other EU institution, the general interest of the Union. However, the same 
cannot be said of situations where it applies national laws through which 
Member States have exercised the options made available to them by the EU 
secondary acts of legislation. Indeed, such national laws constitute a means 
for the Member States to protect their own individual interests and thus to 
preserve their own policy choices. As a result, the ECB is no longer 
safeguarding the EU common interest, but also necessarily individual 
national interests, which may sometimes be at odds with the sustainability of 
the whole system. This aspect clearly breaks with the traditional modes of 
European integration: the ECB is now an EU institution which does not 
solely embody the Union's interests, intended to subsume national ones, but 
also preserves national particularities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has discussed the peculiar features of the SSM in light of the 
theory of European integration and has argued that the ECB's application of 
national laws while supervising significant credit institutions breaks in several 
regards with the traditional modes of European integration.  
The SSM-R comprises several unique features relating to the division of 
competences between the ECB and national supervisors and the relationship 
between EU and national laws. The application of national laws by the ECB 
has significant practical implications, including the identification of the 
national provisions which qualify for direct application, the necessity of 
applying supervisory rules uniformly across Member States, the application 
of procedural rules in the absence of common European rules, and finally 
remedies. Overall, this paper claims that the SSM may be described as a 
hybrid mode of European integration. 
The issues that stem from the new supervision regime are, for the most part, 
not entirely new (for example, the division of competences between the EU 
and national levels and the separation of EU and national laws), but they have 
become more pressing. It is likely that they will give rise to unprecedented 
complexity in cases that will with increasing frequency be brought before EU 
and national courts. 
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It remains to be seen, in practice, whether the system set up by the SSM-R is 
sustainable and ultimately allows for better and more efficient supervision of 
credit institutions, which eliminates or at least substantially mitigates the 
systemic risks that were identified during the global financial crisis and 
during the Eurozone crisis. 
It equally remains to be seen whether the ECB and the national supervisors, 
on the one hand, and EU and national courts, on the other, will depart from 
the traditional ways of furthering European integration to the extent that the 
SSM-R invites them. Indeed, as shown earlier, it is likely that the ECB will 
rely as much as possible on EU law when exercising its supervisory powers. 
This approach, while perhaps blurring the variation in national 
implementations of EU law and the options and discretion left to Member 
States, would nevertheless allow for more clarity, and thus legal certainty, and 
would be more consistent with the principles of non-discrimination and 
equal treatment. The sustainability of the system also strongly depends on 
how the ECB will apply these rules in practice and how national supervisors 
cooperate with them. Similarly, the EU and national courts will play a 
significant role: it remains for them to establish a clear path to the otherwise 
complicated system of judicial review stemming from the SSM-R, for 
example through broad interpretation of the competence conferred to the 
ECB or broad application of the direct effect principle. In other words, it 
remains to be seen to what extent the various actors involved will make use of 
the tools traditionally used to further European integration. Provided that 
supervisors and courts cooperate, it is possible that, in practice, the SSM will 
ultimately share more features with the direct execution of EU law model 
than it does under a literal interpretation of the applicable legal provisions.  
